New International > Policy
Economic Sanctions and Other Trade Restrictions
Over the past few decades, U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch have repeatedly imposed unilateral economic sanctions on a variety of countries for foreign policy purposes. These sanctions have taken the form of import bans, export controls, restrictions on U.S. investment and expatriate activity overseas, and financial controls. All too often, they have been undertaken for ill-defined purposes or with little consideration of their impact. Rather than modifying the behavior of those countries, the sanctions have often damaged U.S. economic interests at home and overseas. The vacuum created by unilateral sanctions is generally filled by our trade competitors, particularly our allies.
Sanctions are generally imposed with little understanding of or concern for their domestic economic consequences. To be even marginally successful, economic sanctions must be multilateral; but because all countries define their foreign policy interests differently, there is rarely a consensus in favor of sanctions. The United States cannot afford to continue a policy of unilateralism when it comes to economic sanctions.
Many people in the executive branch and Congress view U.S. economic interests as divorced from U.S. foreign relations and security interests; in reality, they are inextricably intertwined. In today’s increasingly competitive global economy, U.S. companies are rarely the predominant suppliers of goods and technology. As technology has become more diffuse, the cumulative effect on the U.S. domestic economy of markets lost simply to symbolically distance our country from another country’s behavior is a luxury the United States can no longer afford.
In recent years, Congress has demonstrated increasing support for legislation to reform U.S. sanctions policy and, in some cases, lift unilateral sanctions outright. There are as yet not enough votes to send meaningful sanctions reform to the president for his signature.
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