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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT
No. 06-1410

(consolidated with Nos. 06-1411, 06-1415, 06-1416, and 06-1417)

FILING DEPOSITORY

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

JOINT COARSE PM NAAQS BRIEF FOR
INDUSTRY INTERVENORS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

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**CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,
RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES**

A. Parties and *Amici*

The parties, intervenors, and amici in these consolidated cases are listed in the joint briefs of petitioners.


B. Rulings Under Review

The agency ruling under review is EPA's *National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, Final Rule*, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006).

C. Related Cases

The case on review has not been previously before this Court or any other court.

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Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers is an I.R.C. Section 501(c)(6) not-for-profit trade association of car and light truck manufacturers and whose members include: BMW Group, Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, Mazda North American Operations, Mercedes-Benz USA, Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., Porsche Cars North America, Inc., Toyota Motor North America, Inc. and Volkswagen of America, Inc. The Alliance operates for the purpose of promoting the general commercial, professional, legislative, and other common interests of its members. The Alliance does not have any outstanding shares or debt securities in the hands of the public, nor does it have a parent company. No publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest in the Alliance.

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National Pork Producers Council. The National Pork Producers Council (“NPPC”) is a voluntary non-profit trade association representing 44 affiliated state association members and a significant portion of the domestic pork producing industry. NPPC conducts public policy outreach, product promotion, and market development on behalf of its member-investors and the industry. NPPC has no parent companies, and no publicly-held companies have an ownership interest in NPPC.

National Mining Association. The National Mining Association (“NMA”) is an incorporated national trade association whose members include the producers of most of America's coal, metals, and industrial and agricultural minerals; manufacturers of mining and mineral processing machinery, equipment, and supplies; and engineering and consulting firms that serve the mining industry. NMA has no parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliates that have issued shares or debt securities to the public, although NMA's individual members have done so.

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INTRODUCTION

Intervenor-respondents are a diverse group of industry associations with differing perspectives on the important issues that comprise EPA's final rule regulating coarse particulates. Although their views are aligned as to EPA's decision to eliminate the annual PM₁₀ standard, intervenors disagree among themselves on the merits of EPA's decision to retain the daily PM₁₀ standard. This brief is divided into two sections.

Section I addresses EPA's decision to eliminate the annual PM₁₀ standard. All parties to this brief join Section I and agree that EPA's decision should be affirmed. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to undertake a "thorough review" of NAAQS at five-year intervals, and requires EPA to revise existing standards as "appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7409. There is nothing in the statute requiring EPA to maintain an unwarranted annual PM₁₀ standard. EPA's decision is supported by the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence, which shows the standard is not necessary to protect public health.

Section II addresses EPA's decision to retain the daily PM₁₀ standard. The arguments in this section reflect only the views of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. In the Alliance's view, EPA's decision to retain the hourly PM₁₀ standard is not subject to reversal. The other parties to this brief – the American

Farm Bureau Federation, the National Pork Producers Council, and the National Mining Association — oppose the arguments set forth in Section II.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court Should Deny The Environmental Petitioners’ Challenge To EPA’s Decision To Eliminate The Annual PM₁₀ Standard.

The Environmental Petitioners’ challenge to EPA’s decision to eliminate the annual PM₁₀ standard lacks merit and should be denied.

A. Nothing In The Clean Air Act Prevents EPA From Eliminating The Annual PM₁₀ Standard.

The Environmental Petitioners contend the Clean Air Act prohibits EPA from eliminating the annual PM₁₀ standard, arguing that Congress “incorporat[ed] and preserv[ed]” the PM₁₀ NAAQS in the 1990 Amendments. Env’tl. Pet. Br. 29. According to the Environmental Petitioners, “[b]y building the statutory scheme on EPA’s regulations, which included both 24-hour and annual averaging periods for the PM₁₀ NAAQS, ... Congress limited EPA’s flexibility to revisit its past decisions and change the way areas demonstrate compliance with the PM₁₀ NAAQS.” *Id.* at 29-30.

These arguments plainly lack merit. They are essentially the same arguments, albeit made with respect to PM₁₀, that both this Court and the Supreme Court rejected in the *American Trucking* litigation concerning ozone. In *American Trucking*, this Court rejected arguments that the Clean Air Act’s 1990

Amendments precluded EPA from revising the primary and secondary ozone NAAQS because Congress “codified” a particular ozone NAAQS in the Clean Air Act. *See American Trucking Associations v. EPA*, 175 F.3d 1027, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Later, on review of this Court’s decision, the Supreme Court determined in *Whitman* that the 1990 Amendments did not establish the “exclusive, permanent means of enforcing a revised ozone standard in non-attainment areas.” *Whitman v. American Trucking Associations*, 531 U.S. 457, 484 (2001). The Environmental Petitioners thus concede, as they must, that “the statute leaves room for EPA to revise the standards as appropriate to protect public health and welfare.” *Envtl. Pet. Br.* 30.

The Environmental Petitioners nonetheless maintain that this modification authority does not encompass discretion to eliminate the annual PM₁₀ standard. They put decisive interpretive weight on section 188(d), which permits the Administrator to extend the initial attainment deadline established by statute if the “annual mean concentration of PM₁₀ in the area ... is less than or equal to the standard level.” 42 U.S.C. § 7513(d)(2); *see also id.* § 7513(c)(1) (setting attainment deadline for moderate non-attainment areas). In the Environmental Petitioners’ view, the statutory implementation provisions in sections 107 and 188 revoked EPA’s authority under section 109 to review each NAAQS every five years and to make appropriate modifications.

In granting EPA discretion to extend statutory compliance deadlines for the then-existing PM₁₀ standard, however, Congress was endowing EPA with legal authority to address real-world effects of its existing regulations, not seeking to eliminate EPA's discretion to eliminate standards found not requisite to protect the public health. EPA undoubtedly "retains discretionary authority to avoid regulating risks that it reasonably concludes are trivial in context." *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Nor do the Clean Air Act provisions cited by the Environmental Petitioners suggest that EPA's "control strategy must include both a 24-hour and an annual standard." Env'tl. Pet. Br. 30. The statute provides, rather, that "[n]ational primary ambient air quality standards ... shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which *in the judgment of the Administrator*, ... are requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (emphasis added). The statute makes clear that such "standards may be revised in the same manner as promulgated," *id.*, and requires EPA to review the national standards at regular intervals. *Id.* § 7409(d)(2)(C). In carrying out this statutory directive, EPA is not required to establish standards at a zero-risk level or to maintain standards that are not requisite to protect public health. *National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter*, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144 at 61,145 (Oct. 17, 2006) (citing *Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA*, 647 F.2d 1130, 1156 n.51 (D.C. Cir.

1980)). To the contrary, EPA's "task is to establish standards that are neither more nor less stringent than necessary." *Id.* (citing *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 465-72, 475-76).

This plain reading of the relevant statutory provisions is supported by the legislative history. The Clean Air Act's 1990 Amendments demonstrate that EPA's authority to promulgate and revise NAAQS (as set forth in sections 108 and 109) is separate from, and intended to precede, its authority to implement and enforce whatever standards it has promulgated or revised (as set forth in sections 107 and 188). The House Report thus states that section 101 of the 1990 Amendments, which revised section 107(d), was intended "to establish a somewhat different structure for State and EPA action *following promulgation of a new or revised NAAQS.*" H.R. Rep. No. 101-490 at 215 (1990) (emphasis added). The House Report further explains that section 107(d) was revised "to provide that *after the Administrator promulgates a new or revised NAAQS*, each State is required to designate each area within the State as nonattainment, attainment, or unclassifiable ... for the *new or revised standard.*" *Id.* (emphasis added). The House Report likewise notes that, under the revised section 107(d), it was Congress's intent that, "[a]fter promulgating a new or revised NAAQS, the Administrator must promulgate the [attainment] designations for all areas of the country as expeditiously as practicable." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Similarly, contrary to the Environmental Petitioners' assertions, section 188(d) does not mandate both an annual and 24-hour standard. To the contrary, the House Report simply notes that "[s]ection 188(d) authorizes the Administrator to allow up to two one year extensions of the attainment date if the State has met all SIP commitments and has not recorded more than one exceedance of the standard in the year preceding the extension year." *Id.* at 263. There is no indication that Congress intended section 188 to limit EPA's discretion to roll back the "standard" to be attained in circumstances where that standard is unnecessary to protect public health.

In short, Congress did not cast in stone a particular standard for coarse particulates, or set forth an exclusive or permanent means for enforcing compliance with the regulatory standards. To the contrary, it specifically required EPA's Administrator to exercise judgment to adopt standards required to protect public health, and to revise or eliminate standards that are not necessary to serve that goal. Because it is now clear, in the wake of *Whitman*, that the Clean Air Act does not permit EPA to regulate when regulation is not "requisite" for public-health protection, EPA's decision to revoke the unnecessary annual PM₁₀ standard was mandatory and fully appropriate.

B. EPA's Decision To Eliminate The Annual PM₁₀ Standard Is Supported By Record Evidence.

The Environmental Petitioners contend that EPA's decision to eliminate the annual PM₁₀ standard was not justified. But this contention overlooks the extensive scientific support for EPA's decision.

After examining the scientific evidence, EPA determined that "an annual averaging time is not currently warranted for the coarse particle standard." 71 Fed. Reg. at 61,198. EPA specifically found with respect to the annual PM₁₀ standard that the "available evidence" shows no association between long-term exposure to coarse particulates and adverse health effects. *See also* 71 Fed. Reg. at 61,180 ("available epidemiological studies do not provide evidence that long-term community-levels exposure to thoracic coarse particles is associated with mortality or morbidity"). EPA further determined what is mathematically obvious and inevitable: A "24-hour standard would in effect also provide protection against any as yet unidentified potential effects of long-term exposure at ambient levels." *Id.* at 61,198-61,199 ("an annual coarse particle standard is not warranted at this time").

EPA's determination is supported by the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, which agrees that an annual standard is "not currently warranted" and expressed its support for the decision to eliminate the annual standard. CASAC Review of EPA Staff Recommendations, *available at* <http://www.epa.gov>

/sab/panels/casacpmpanel.html. CASAC's recommendations were consistent, moreover, with the findings of EPA's staff. Although some parties, including the Environmental Petitioners, suggested that an annual standard should be retained to provide additional protection against the effects of short-term exposure, EPA's staff noted, after reviewing the relevant scientific evidence, that there is "little basis" for retaining "an annual averaging time for protecting against such health effects." PM Staff Paper, at 5-71.

Moreover, the Environmental Petitioners engage in selective citation of the record in contending that the annual standard was adopted to protect against both short- and long-term exposures. Although EPA stated during the previous PM₁₀ rulemaking that the annual standard would yield benefits in reducing short-term exposures, those benefits were not the reason EPA adopted the annual standard. To the contrary, EPA concluded that the 24-hour standard it was adopting was set at a level that "will provide adequate protection against the known and potential effects of short-term coarse fraction particle exposures that have been identified to date in the scientific literature." *National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter*, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,679 (July 18, 1997). A similar statement was made about the annual standard. *Id.* at 38,678-79. Each standard was thus justified on its own. Accordingly, EPA's decision based on new evidence and additional experience to revoke the annual standard does not

eliminate protections against short-term exposures that EPA assertedly relied on in promulgating the annual standard in 1997.

Because scientific evidence shows that an annual standard is not requisite to protect public health, EPA's determination was fully appropriate and not subject to reversal.

II. EPA's Decision To Retain The Daily PM₁₀ Standard Is Not Subject To Reversal.

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers contends that EPA's decision to retain the pre-existing daily PM₁₀ standard is justified on grounds that it maintains a regulatory *status quo* in the face of scientific and technological uncertainty. (The other Industry Intervenors oppose this section of the brief.)

A. The Clean Air Act Requires And, In Any Event, Permits EPA To Favor The Status Quo.

The Supreme Court held in *Whitman* that EPA must establish uniform national standards at a "requisite" level – that is, at a level "sufficient but not more than necessary" – to protect public health from the adverse effects of pollutants in the ambient air. 531 U.S. at 473. *Whitman* recognized that a zero-risk standard is neither possible nor what the statute demands. *Id.* at 475.

What the statute does demand is analytical rigor in finding a level of health protection that is requisite but no more than necessary, in stark contrast to the analytically loose "totality of the circumstances" approach EPA previously

used for standard setting. Under its pre-*Whitman* approach, EPA relied on impressionistic assessments of what pollutant concentrations were needed to protect public health, resulting in a continuous downward creep towards zero as the frontiers of scientific knowledge were pushed back. Under *Whitman*, by contrast, this unwarranted downward bias is eliminated and EPA must impose standards at levels that are “requisite but not more than necessary.” Hence, it can no longer be maintained that the Act contemplates a bias toward greater stringency in standard setting – either based on its textual reference to an “adequate margin of safety” or otherwise. *Id.* 475-76; *cf.* EPA Br. 94-95 (wrongly suggesting a bias toward greater stringency based on the Act’s supposed “precautionary” stance toward public-health protection).

Accordingly, once a NAAQS standard has been established and upheld on judicial review, EPA is justified in maintaining the status quo in the face of scientific or technological uncertainty. *See International Fabricare Inst. v. EPA*, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (in areas of “scientific and technological uncertainty” the court must avoid “all temptation to direct the agency”). Precisely because the statute seeks to establish a regulatory golden mean reflecting a level “requisite” but not “more than necessary” to provide an “adequate” margin of safety, both the Administrator and reviewing courts should place the burden of persuasion on those who would alter existing

standards as opposed to maintaining them. *Cf. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC*, 280 F.3d 1027, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing provisions requiring FCC to critically review and “repeal or modify” any rule “not in the public interest”). Absent affirmative evidence that existing standards are not protecting public health, or that less-stringent standards would be equally effective, it is appropriate for EPA to withhold standard modifications pending the accumulation of further scientific evidence.

B. EPA’s Decision To Maintain The Pre-Existing Daily PM₁₀ Standard Is Not Subject To Reversal.

The Industry Petitioners argue that EPA’s retention of the pre-existing PM₁₀ standard is unlawful. In their view, because the daily PM₁₀ standard depends on daily levels of PM_{2.5}, the standard will result in “arbitrarily varying PM coarse levels” that are not requisite to protect public health.

In *American Trucking*, this Court held that EPA did not adequately justify the PM₁₀ standard because, although EPA believed the PM₁₀ standard would work in conjunction with the PM_{2.5} standard, the agency provided “no explanation to aid [the court] in understanding its decision.” *ATA*, 175 F.3d at 1054. In the absence of an adequate explanation, the Court expressed concern that the two indicators “when used together” would “lead to ‘double regulation’ of the PM_{2.5} component of PM₁₀ and potential underregulation of PM_{10-2.5} component.” *Id.* The Court held that EPA could not justify using PM₁₀ merely

for reasons of “administrative convenience” unrelated to “public health” – namely, because “a nationwide monitoring program for PM₁₀ already exists.” *Id.*

The Industry Petitioners contend that EPA’s decision to maintain the PM₁₀ standard continues to rest on mere “administrative convenience.” *Indus. Pet. Br.* 32. But that mischaracterizes EPA’s most recent explanation for its decision. In fact, as the rulemaking documents show, EPA considered all the available options and determined that other potential approaches were not as effective as the existing daily PM₁₀ standard in protecting public health, were “more stringent than necessary,” and/or were not supported by sound science. 71 Fed. Reg. at 61,195 (a PM₁₀ standard is “more effective[] and more appropriate[] than all other indicators evaluated by EPA”); *id.* at 61,193 (a qualified indicator would be “insufficiently protective” of health).

Relatedly, the Industry Petitioners assert that retaining the PM₁₀ standard results in an unjustified double regulation because “EPA has offered no intelligible rationale” for regulating PM fine through two distinct 24-hour NAAQS. *See Indus. Pet. Br.* 35. In fact, however, EPA provided a detailed explanation to “aid” this reviewing Court in understanding its decision, addressing this precise concern. *See* 71 Fed. Reg. at 61,196. Significantly, nothing in the Clean Air Act requires EPA to divide NAAQS programs into hermetically sealed and separate categories. EPA’s NAAQS for sulfur oxides, for instance,

overlaps substantially with its NAAQS for fine and coarse particulates. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.7; *Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Minnesota*, 72 Fed. Reg. 68,508, at 68,510 (Dec. 5, 2007) (recognizing that sulfur dioxide is “a precursor of acid rain and fine particulate matter formation”). Likewise, EPA’s NAAQS for ozone overlaps with its NAAQS for nitrogen oxides, which are precursors to ozone formation in the ambient air. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-50.11; *Proposed Rule to Implement the Fine Particle National Ambient Air Quality Standards*, 70 Fed. Reg. 65,984, at 66,034-66,035 (Nov. 1, 2005) (nitrogen oxide is a precursor to ozone). The fact that daily levels of fine particulates – PM_{2.5} – are regulated once under the daily PM_{2.5} standard and again under the daily PM₁₀ standard presents nothing anomalous viewed in the overall context of EPA NAAQS standards.

More substantively, the Industry Petitioners contend that EPA’s retention of the daily PM₁₀ standard is improper because allowable levels of coarse particles (PM_{10-2.5}) will continue to depend on the amount of fine particles (PM_{2.5}) in the ambient air. See *Indus. Pet. Br. 34*. But this glosses over EPA’s justification for the overlap. EPA explained that, given the current science, including PM_{2.5} in the PM₁₀ indicator provides the most appropriate “targeted health protection,” because it permits daily levels of coarse particulates to vary depending on daily PM_{2.5} levels, which generally correspond to areas in which concentrations of

coarse particles may raise health risks. EPA further explained that, “to the extent that higher PM_{2.5} levels lead to a lower allowable level of coarse particles in some areas compared to others, this will occur in precisely those locations – *i.e.* urban or industrial areas – where the science has shown the strongest evidence of adverse health effects associated with exposure to coarse particles.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 61,195-61,196. In contrast, “lower levels of PM_{2.5} lead to a higher allowable level of coarse particles” in precisely those areas where “the health risks associated with coarse particles” are “inconclusive.” *Id.* at 61,196.

The Industry Petitioners also object that EPA “offers no data and no evidence” that the “asserted health risks from contaminated urban coarse particles are *directly proportional* to ambient levels of PM_{2.5}.” Indus. Pet. Br. 35. But no showing of “direct proportionality” is required. Instead, EPA necessarily made the types of fine regulatory judgments inherent in the task of establishing numerical regulatory standards that seek to reconcile competing considerations pulling in opposing directions by pinpointing an optimal numerical value. *See Hocr v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (agencies often must make “reasonable but arbitrary (not in the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ sense) rules”).


Here, EPA’s suite of coarse and fine standards, taken together, effectively establish an absolute limit on daily fine particulates that may never be exceeded.

As long as that absolute limit is met, the suite of standards permit the substitution of coarse particle concentrations for fine particle concentrations within the overall cap. Especially given the Industry Petitioners' insistence that coarse particulate exposures are significantly less harmful than similar fine particulate exposures (a characterization with which the Alliance takes issue), allowing such substitutions — substitutions of less harmful pollutant concentrations for more harmful ones — can hardly be deemed arbitrary or capricious.


CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, EPA's decision should be affirmed.


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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure And Circuit Rule 32(a)(2), I hereby certify that the textual portion of the foregoing brief (exclusive of the disclosure statement, tables of contents and authorities, certificates of service and compliance, but including footnotes) contains 3,179 words as determined by the word-counting feature of Microsoft Word 2000.



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, I hereby certify that I have this 29th day of January, 2008, served a copy of the foregoing documents by first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon:

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