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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTHEW C. KILGORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM BRUCE FULLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, successor in interest to Keybank USA, N.A.; KEY EDUCATION RESOURCES, a division of Keybank National Association; GREAT LAKES EDUCATION LOAN SERVICES, INC., a Wisconsin corporation,

Defendants-Appellants,

No. 09-16703

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MATTHEW C. KILGORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM BRUCE FULLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, successor in interest to Keybank USA, N.A.; KEY EDUCATION RESOURCES, a division of Keybank National Association; GREAT LAKES EDUCATION LOAN SERVICES, INC., a Wisconsin corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-15934

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-02958-TEH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

> Argued and Submitted En Banc December 11, 2012—Pasadena, California

> > Filed April 11, 2013

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Harry Pregerson, M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher, Richard C. Tallman, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr., Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen, Paul J. Watford, and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz; Dissent by Judge Pregerson

SUMMARY*

Arbitration

The en banc court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, reversed the denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and remanded with instructions to the district court to compel arbitration.

In an appeal involving a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans and the loan servicer, the en banc court held that the district court should have compelled arbitration under California law. The en banc court held that the arbitration clause was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable under California law. The en banc court held also that this case does not fall under the narrow "public injunction" exception to the Federal Arbitration Act that was

^{*} This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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recognized in *Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers*, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2007).

Judge Pregerson dissented. Judge Pregerson would hold that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and thus unenforceable.

COUNSEL

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C. Dawn Causey and Gregory F. Taylor, American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers Association, and the Clearing House Association, L.L.C.

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OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

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This appeal involves a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans and the loan servicer. The central issue is whether the district court should have compelled arbitration. We hold that this case does not fall under the narrow "public injunction" exception to the Federal Arbitration Act we recognized in *Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers*, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2007), and remand with instructions to compel arbitration.

I.

A.

Silver State Helicopters, LLC ("SSH") operated a flight-training school in Oakland, California. SSH referred to KeyBank, N.A. ("KeyBank") as a "preferred lender" in marketing materials and encouraged prospective students to borrow from KeyBank. KeyBank financed virtually all SSH student tuition; Great Lakes Educational Loan Services ("Great Lakes") serviced the loans.

Every SSH student borrowing from KeyBank executed a promissory note ("Note"). The Note contained an arbitration clause, located in a section entitled "ARBITRATION," which provided, in relevant part:

IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM,

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NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM FURTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. . . . I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. . . .

There shall be no authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis. Furthermore, an arbitration can only decide your or my Claim(s) and may not consolidate or join the claims of other persons that may have similar claims.

The Note further provided that "[t]his Arbitration Provision will apply to my Note . . . unless I notify you in writing that I reject the arbitration provisions within 60 days of signing my Note."

¹ The Note contained a choice-of-law clause providing that disputes would be governed by Ohio law and a forum-selection provision requiring disputes to be contested in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, KeyBank's principal place of business.

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B.

Matthew Kilgore and William Fuller ("Plaintiffs") were SSH students, who each borrowed over \$50,000 from KeyBank. The Oakland school failed before they could graduate. After the school's demise, Plaintiffs brought this putative class action suit against KeyBank and Great Lakes (collectively, "Defendants") in California Superior Court, seeking to enjoin Defendants from reporting loan defaults to credit agencies and from enforcing Notes against former students.² The gravamen of the complaint was that Defendants had violated the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–17210, because the Note and SSH's contracts with students failed to include language specified in the Federal Trade Commission's "Holder Rule."

² Plaintiffs amended the complaint in state court to add a third representative plaintiff, Kevin Wilhelmy, and two defendants, Student Loan Xpress and American Education Services. These parties eventually settled and are no longer involved in this litigation.

³ The Federal Trade Commission promulgated the Holder Rule in 1975 in response to concerns that sellers of goods and services were increasingly separating "the consumer's duty to pay from the seller's duty to perform" either by selling loan instruments to a third party after execution or by acting as a conduit between purchasers and third-party lenders. Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,507 (Nov. 18, 1975) (emphasis omitted) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 433). The Rule requires consumer credit contracts to include the following language: "ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a).

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Defendants timely removed the case to the District Court for the Northern District of California,⁴ and filed a motion to compel arbitration. After the district court denied the motion, *Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat'l Ass'n*, No. C 08-2958 TEH, 2009 WL 1975271, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009),⁵ Defendants appealed. We have jurisdiction over Defendants' appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C).

After Defendants filed their notice of appeal, the district court allowed Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint. The court then granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *Kilgore v. KeyBank*, 712 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947–58 (N.D. Cal.

Plaintiffs do not assert that the Holder Rule gives rise to a private cause of action, but instead seek to vindicate this right through their state law claim. *See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.*, 485 F.2d 986, 988–89 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that private actions to vindicate rights asserted under the Federal Trade Commission Act may not be maintained).

⁴ The notice of removal invoked federal jurisdiction based on a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; complete diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); and minimal diversity under the Class Action Fairness Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). After removal, Plaintiffs dropped their federal question claims.

⁵ In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the district court applied California law, notwithstanding the Ohio choice-of-law provision in the Note. *Kilgore*, 2009 WL 1975271, at *5–8 (citing *Hoffman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.*, 546 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (applying California conflict-of-law analysis to choice-of-law provision in credit card contract)). We need not consider which law is applicable as the result would be the same in light of our decision that the district court should have compelled arbitration. *See* note 11, *infra*.

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2010). Plaintiffs appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Π.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by dismissing their third amended complaint, and Defendants argue that the district court erred by refusing to compel arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, if Defendants are correct, the district court should never have reached the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. *See* 9 U.S.C. § 3 (requiring stay of civil action during arbitration). Therefore, we begin with whether the district court erred in declining to compel arbitration, a decision we review *de novo*. *Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009).

A.

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") makes an agreement to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA was intended to "overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law," *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985), that resulted in "courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate," *Allied-Bruce*

⁶ The district court held that the various counts in the third amended complaint either failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, *Kilgore*, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 947–53, or were preempted by federal law, *id*. at 953–58.

⁷ We consolidated the two appeals. Order, *Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n*, Nos. 09-16703, 10-15934 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010).

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Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). Recent opinions of the Supreme Court have given broad effect to arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203-04 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding arbitration provision despite state law prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal injury and wrongful death claims); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempted a California rule that made class action waivers unconscionable); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (confining FAA exemption for workers engaged in interstate commerce to transportation workers).

The FAA "mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). The basic role for courts under the FAA is to determine "(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

B.

Section 2 of the FAA contains a savings clause, which provides that arbitration agreements are "enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. This savings clause "preserves generally applicable contract defenses." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Plaintiffs advance two theories as to why the FAA savings clause defeats the arbitration clause in the Note. We find neither availing.

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Under the FAA savings clause, state law that "arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally" remains applicable to arbitration agreements. *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 685–87 (1996) (quoting *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). "Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2." *Casarotto*, 517 U.S. at 687.

Under California law, a contractual provision is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.*, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). "[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." *Id.*

"Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness or overly harsh effect of the contract term or clause." *Harper v. Ultimo*, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Plaintiffs claimed below that the Note's ban on class arbitration is unconscionable under California law, but that argument is now expressly foreclosed by *Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Plaintiffs' assertion that students may not

⁸ In holding that California law rendered the class arbitration waiver unconscionable, the district court relied on *Discover Bank v. Superior Court*, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), *abrogated by Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. In addressing the issue, the district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's later *Concepcion* opinion.

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be able to afford arbitration fees fares no better. *See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph*, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) ("The 'risk' that [a plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement."). And nothing else in the arbitration clause in the Note suggests substantive unconscionability. *Cf. Armendariz*, 6 P.3d at 690–94 (holding unilateral arbitration provision substantively unconscionable); *Harper*, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423 (explaining substantive unconscionability of arbitration damages limit).

Nor is the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable. "Procedural unconscionability focuses on the factors of surprise and oppression. . . ." Harper, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422. The arbitration clause allows students to reject arbitration within sixty days of signing the Note. This provision is more forgiving than the one in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, where we found thirty days a sufficient period in which to consider whether to opt out of arbitration. 283 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor was the arbitration clause buried in fine print in the Note, but was instead in its own section, clearly labeled, in boldface. Cf. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding procedural unconscionability of

⁹ The Note also includes a clause preventing disclosure of any arbitration award. Although we have found confidentiality provisions to be substantively unconscionable when applied to a large class of customers, *Ting v. AT&T*, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003), the small number of putative class members in this case (approximately 120) mitigates such concerns. In any event, the enforceability of the confidentiality clause is a matter distinct from the enforceability of the arbitration clause in general. Plaintiffs are free to argue during arbitration that the confidentiality clause is not enforceable.

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consequential damage provision contained in middle of last page of an agreement in inconspicuous font).

2.

a.

The UCL authorizes broad injunctive relief to protect the public from unfair business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. The Supreme Court has suggested that claims arising from a statute whose underlying purpose creates an "inherent conflict" with the federal policy favoring arbitration may be exempt from the FAA. ¹⁰ *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Relying on *Gilmer*, the California Supreme Court has found an inherent conflict between the FAA policy favoring arbitration and California statutes authorizing "public" injunctive relief. *Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal.*, 988 P.2d 67, 73, 78 (Cal. 1999).

The *Broughton* plaintiffs "were covered by Medi–Cal, which had negotiated a contract with Cigna . . . for health care coverage." *Id.* at 71. They sued Cigna under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750–85, seeking damages for medical malpractice and injunctive relief against Cigna's allegedly deceptive advertising. *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 71. The California Supreme Court held the damages claim subject to the arbitration clause in the Cigna policy because "[s]uch an action is primarily for the benefit of a party to the arbitration, even if the action incidentally vindicates important public

¹⁰ The parties dispute whether the "inherent conflict" exemption is limited to federal statutes or applies to both federal and state statutes. For the reasons discussed below, we need not resolve this issue.

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interests." Id. at 79. But the Court also found that because the plaintiffs were "functioning as a private attorney general, enjoining future deceptive practices on behalf of the general public," id. at 76, their injunction claims were not arbitrable, id. at 75–78.

The California Supreme Court expanded upon Broughton in Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003). Plaintiff there alleged that PacifiCare had fraudulently induced its customers to enroll in health care programs while at the same time discouraging primary care physicians from providing services to enrollees. Id. at 1159. The complaint sought injunctive and monetary relief under the UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, which prohibits unfair business practices, and under section 17500 of the same, which prohibits untrue or misleading statements designed to mislead the public. Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1164-65. PacifiCare invoked the arbitration clause in its contract with enrollees. Id. at 1160.

As in Broughton, the California Supreme Court in Cruz held that the plaintiff's claims for monetary relief were subject to arbitration, because any public benefit from such relief would be "incidental to the private benefits obtained from those bringing the restitutionary or damages action." Id. at 1166. Extending the reasoning of Broughton to claims brought under the UCL and Business and Professions Code, the Cruz court found "the request for injunctive relief is clearly for the benefit of health care consumers and the general public" and therefore not subject to arbitration. Id. at 1164.

We applied the Broughton-Cruz framework in Davis, 485 F.3d at 1081-84. There, an employer "adopted and

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distributed to its employees a new Dispute Resolution Program (DRP) that culminated in final and binding arbitration of most employment-related claims by and against its employees." *Id.* at 1070. The DRP prohibited the filing of both judicial and administrative actions. *Id.* at 1081–82. Citing the *Gilmer* dictum, we noted that "employment rights under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] and California's Labor Code" were analogous to substantive "statutory rights established for a public reason." *Id.* at 1082 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because the *Davis* plaintiffs sought to vindicate these statutory rights through public injunctions, we found the DRP unenforceable to the extent that it barred claims for public injunctive relief. *Id.*

b.

Defendants argue that *Davis* was vitiated by *Concepcion*, and the *Broughton-Cruz* rule no longer exempts a public injunction claim from arbitration. We need not reach that broad argument. Even assuming the continued viability of the *Broughton-Cruz* rule, Plaintiffs' claims do not fall within its purview.

Public injunctive relief "is for the benefit of the general public rather than the party bringing the action." *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 78. A claim for public injunctive relief therefore does not seek "to resolve a private dispute but to remedy a public wrong." *Id.* at 76. Whatever the subjective motivation behind a party's purported public injunction suit, the *Broughton* rule applies only when "the benefits of granting injunctive relief by and large do not accrue to that party, but to the general public in danger of being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff suffered." *Id.*

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The claim for injunctive relief here does not fall within the "narrow exception to the rule that the FAA requires state courts to honor arbitration agreements." Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1162. The third amended complaint seeks an injunction prohibiting Defendants from reporting non-payment of a Note by putative class members to credit agencies, from enforcing a Note against any class member, and from disbursing the proceeds of any loans to a seller whose consumer credit contract did not include Holder Rule language. The requested prohibitions against reporting defaults on the Note and seeking enforcement of the Note plainly would benefit only the approximately 120 putative class members. requested injunction against disbursing loans to sellers who do not include Holder Rule language in their contracts, while ostensibly implicating third parties, also falls outside the The third amended complaint Broughton-Cruz rule. expressly notes that KeyBank had completely withdrawn from the private school loan business and does not allege that the bank is engaging in other comparable transactions. The injunctive relief sought thus, for all practical purposes, relates only to past harms suffered by the members of the limited putative class.

The central premise of *Broughton-Cruz* is that "the judicial forum has significant institutional advantages over arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators." *Broughton*, 988 P.2d at 78. That concern is absent here, where Defendants' alleged statutory violations have, by Plaintiffs' own admission, already ceased, where the class affected by the alleged practices is small, and where

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there is no real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief sought.¹¹

III.

For the reasons above, we **VACATE** the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, **REVERSE** the denial of Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, and **REMAND** with instructions to the district court to compel arbitration.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I. Hustled by the school; hustled by the bank.

Silver State Helicopter School did not do a good job training helicopter pilots, placing them in jobs, or managing its own finances. But it did make a convincing sales pitch. Silver State promised its students that they would get the training required to get good paying jobs as commercial helicopter pilots.

At flashy career fairs around California, Silver State worked hard to sign up prospective students for its helicopter pilot training program. Former Silver State student, Mathew Kilgore, declared under penalty of perjury:

¹¹ Because we hold that arbitration is required under California law, we need not address Defendants' contention that Ohio law (which apparently has no *Broughton-Cruz* rule, see Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1170 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)) should apply.

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The seminar was very impressive and glitzy. There were numerous helicopters onsite and the school appeared to be very professional. [Silver State's CEO, Jerry Airola] was very convincing and portrayed Silver State as a top flight school. The presentation made clear that Silver State was very selective about which students would be chosen to attend the school . . . Mr. Airola emphasized that all of the tuition to fund the entire Silver State education could be obtained through Silver State's partner lender, KeyBank. Mr. Airola also emphasized that . . . the loans would only cost the students about [a] hundred dollars a week at 4% interest.

Airola's claims were not true. Silver State accepted almost all applicants who could get their loans approved. Silver State lacked sufficient equipment or instructors to properly train its students. The variable rate interest on the loans would rise far above four percent. Matthew Kilgore, William Fuller, and the other 120 putative class members believed what Airola told them and signed up. They took out \$55,950 loans, which KeyBank promptly forked over to Silver State before students took a single class.

But Silver State knew it was headed for a crash landing. By 2008, Silver State had racked up ten million dollars in debt against fifty thousand dollars in assets. Moreover, despite Silver State's alluring promises, there was no significant demand for helicopter pilots with a Silver State

¹ See Appendix at 9.

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KeyBank, an Ohio-based lending giant, participated in the fraud that Silver State perpetrated on unwitting students. From 2003 to 2005 KeyBank financed ninety-five percent of the tuition students paid to Silver State. KeyBank printed up lengthy loan papers that lacked the Federal Trade Commission's Holder Rule Notice. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 The Holder Rule required the loan contracts to notify students that KeyBank was subject to the same claims and defenses as Silver State. Id. The Holder Rule protects borrowers, such as the students, from being legally obligated to pay a creditor like KeyBank "despite breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or even fraud on the part of the seller." 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,507 (Nov. 18, 1975). By omitting that notice from its printed loan contracts, KeyBank may have sought to insulate itself from liability for Silver State's misleading promises. Silver State then presented those faulty loan contracts to prospective students and "pressure[d] the students to sign the [master promissory notes] as soon as possible," according to an affidavit of Silver State's former student finance manager Jody Pidruzny. And sign up they did.

Once a student signed the promissory note, KeyBank immediately transferred the full amount of the loans to Silver State. KeyBank then turned a profit by selling the students' loans on the securities market to investors. Defendant Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. continues to service those loans by collecting payments from students, and notifying credit reporting agencies when students fail to pay.

KeyBank loaned students tuition money to attend Silver State knowing that Silver State was financially volatile. A ID: 8585719

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2004 email between KeyBank Vice Presidents Paul McDermott and Rodney Landrum predicted that Silver State "could be the next 'big one' to go under." Nevertheless, KeyBank made more than ten million dollars in loans to Silver State students over the following two years. In 2008, Silver State filed for bankruptcy and closed its doors. Students could not recoup the amount of their unused tuition because Silver State sought protection under Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.

Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates were left holding the bag with no degree, no helicopter piloting career, and no opportunity to train. The students' failed attempts to launch flight careers saddled them with huge private loans that are collecting interest and weighing them down.

The private loans students incurred to pay for Silver State helicopter pilot training were not subsidized or insured by the federal government. Private student loans are generally more expensive than federal loans, especially for students with lower credit scores or limited credit histories. Students could borrow larger amounts because there are no loan limits for private loans. Morever, students who hold private loans are not eligible for federal programs that allow them to reduce their monthly payments based on their income, or have their loans forgiven after working for ten years in public service jobs.²

² See Editorial, Student Debt and the Economy, N.Y. Times, March 10, 2013, at SR 10 ("Because private loans offer little flexibility, borrowers in bad straits have few options except default, which makes it difficult for them to get jobs or credit, or even to rent apartments.").

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Unlike federally guaranteed loans, private student loans are not discharged should the school go out of business. The students themselves cannot discharge these loans in bankruptcy proceedings unless they can prove that "excepting such [student] debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

II. Ignored by the courts.

To make matters worse, the majority opinion strips Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates of the ability to find recourse in state or federal court. The majority holds that we must compel arbitration in the students' case, a holding at odds with the district court's decision. According to the majority, the arbitration clause was not unconscionable. I disagree.

A contract provision is unenforceable under California law if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. *See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc.*, 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). California applies a sliding scale to determine if a contract is unenforceable due to unconscionability. *Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.*, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). The more substantively unconscionable it must be to be found unconscionable, and vice versa. *Id.* Here, the arbitration clause is highly procedurally *and* substantively unconscionable.

A. Procedurally Unconscionable

If both parties agree to give up the protections of the courts, arbitration can be a just and efficient way to resolve disputes. But Kilgore, Fuller, and their classmates signed

contracts under unconscionable "take it or leave it" conditions. *Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc.*, 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). This means that they did not agree to arbitration. Without such an agreement, it is wholly inappropriate to stop them from having their claims decided by a court.

Under California law: "A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion, *i.e.*, a standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." *Ting v. AT&T*, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). Procedural unconscionability focuses on the "the factors of surprise and oppression in the contracting process." *Pokorny*, 601 F.3d at 996.

There can be no doubt that the promissory notes were contracts of adhesion, and that surprise and oppression dominated the contracting process. I have attached as an Appendix the dense, small print, and blurry nine-page contract that Silver State thrust on the students at career fairs and open houses. The arbitration clause at issue was buried in the middle of the contract, split over two pages, and surrounded by language that was difficult to read and understand. See Appendix at 3-4; see also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F. 3d 1165, 1171 (2003) ("Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). officials never discussed the loans with students or mentioned the arbitration clause to them. KeyBank left those jobs to Silver State's financial aid staff-employees who, according to the record, did not know that the loans contained Case: 09-16703 04/11/2013 ID: 8585719 DktEntry: 169-1 Page: 24 of 35

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arbitration clauses. Silver State staff pressured students to sign the loans immediately or else risk losing their spots in the school. Pidruzny, the school's Student Finance Manager, explained the strategy in her sworn declaration:

At the direction of my superiors I conveyed KeyBank's and Silver State's directives to expedite the loan application process and pressure the students to sign the [Master Promissory Notes] as soon as possible . . . I did not discuss the terms of the [Master Promissory Notes] with Silver State students. Specifically, I did not discuss the Arbitration Provision with any Silver State Student

In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that students felt pressured to sign the contract without knowing it contained an arbitration clause. Moreover, the sixty day opt-out provision was meaningless because students did not know the arbitration clause existed in the first place. As Kilgore declared, "I did not know that the Promissory Note contained an arbitration provision (nor did I know that I could opt out of the arbitration provision) . . . I believed that the Promissory Note had to be signed immediately and I felt pressured to do so. I believed that if I did not sign the Promissory Note I would lose my spot at Silver State." Surprise? Yes. Oppression? Yes. Procedural unconscionability? Definitely.

B. Substantively Unconscionable

A contract provision is substantively unconscionable if it is "one-sided and will have an overly harsh effect on the disadvantaged party. Thus, mutuality is the paramount consideration when assessing substantive unconscionability."

Pokorny, 601 F.3d at 997 (internal quotations and citations omitted). To make that determination, courts must "look beyond facial neutrality and examine the actual effects of the challenged provision." *Ting*, 319 F.3d at 1149. KeyBank's contract fails the mutuality test in three respects:

- 1. The confidentiality provision requires both parties to maintain the confidentiality of any claim they arbitrate. While facially neutral, this claim overwhelmingly favors KeyBank. A student who wins in arbitration against KeyBank cannot alert other students or arbitrators to KeyBank's predatory practices that led to the win. But KeyBank is a repeat player in these arbitrations; it knows the outcome of each arbitration and can use that knowledge to its advantage. *Id.* at 1152 (Defendant "has placed itself in a far superior legal posture by ensuring that none of its potential opponents have access to precedent while, at the same time, defendant accumulates a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its own unilaterally crafted contract.").
- 2. The high cost of arbitration imposes another unequal burden, creating further substantive unconscionability. Filing a civil case in California Superior Court costs less than five hundred dollars. Filing the same claim before an arbitrator, runs more than four thousand dollars. The high cost of arbitration will prevent many students from vindicating their rights, but will not limit KeyBank's ability to defend itself. This asymmetry makes arbitration all the more unconscionable. *See Ting*, 319 F.3d at 1151 (finding a feesplitting arbitration clause unconscionable "because it imposes on some consumers costs greater than those a complainant would bear if he or she would file the same complaint in court.").

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3. The arbitration process itself greatly favors banks over consumers. One study found that the National Arbitration Forum, one of the two arbitrators named in the contract, ruled for banks and credit card companies, and against consumers ninety-four percent of the time.³ This further gives KeyBank an unfair advantage in resolving any claims.

KeyBank foisted loans on students who staked their financial well-being on the shaky promises of Silver State Helicopter school. When Silver State went down, so did the students. The students deserve, and I submit the law requires, that their claims be heard and adjudicated by a court. The provision in the promissory note relegating students to arbitration is unconscionable and thus unenforceable. Therefore, I dissent.

³ Public Citizen, *The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensare Consumers* 2 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.

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APPENDIX

REDACTED*

Key Alternative Loan Program

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name; Matt C. Kilgore

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosience Name:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

MASTER STUDENT LOAN PROMISSORY NOTE
No white-outs or scratch-outs of terms will be accepted on this Promis

A. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND TERMS
In this Application/Muster Student Luan Promissory Note, unless otherwise provided, the sentie 1,1 "see," "out," "us," "rme," "my," and "nine" mean the person(s) who signed this Application/Master Student Luan Promissory Note as herower, co-hormwer, andier scanger. "You!," "your," "yours," and "lender" must KeylBank National Association, Clevehard, Ohio, or its successors and sosigists, and any other holder of this Master Student Loan Promissory Note. Terms in initial capital letters in this Note have the definitions set forth in Paragraph D or clesswhere in this Note have the definitions set forth in Paragraph D or clesswhere in this Note, unless subcrivine noted.

R. PROMISE TO PAY CONSOLIDATION; ACGINEGATING BALANCES
This is a consultance credit baseation, is growing to ray to your order or in any

capital leners in this Note have the definitions set forth in Paragraph D or elsewhere in this Note, unless otherwise noted.

R. PROMISE TO PAY; CONSOLIDATION; AGGINGATING BALANCES This is a consumer crofit its assention; in promise to pay to your order or in any subsequent holder all principial nums disbursed under the terms of this Note and, in didition, instruction on such particulated interest, and other charges and fees that may become due as provided in this Note. I will pay all of these amounts to you at the address shown in my coupton book. I understand and agree that you may make multiple Leans to use under the KeyBank National Association. Long Programs Washed to Paragraph D.16 ("the Lean Program") subject to the terms of this Note. I understand and agree that this Note self-facility and the self-facility of the self-facility and self-facilit

will be accepted on this Promissory Note.

receive a coupon book on any Loan(s) addject to the terms of this Note. For purposes of this Paragraph C.G. The refers only to the borrower

D. DEFINITIONS

J. Ammount Requested - means the dollar amount of the Linan requested at the time of my Application.

J. Application - incare the written or oral request that I make to you for a Lean under the Lean Program.

S. Capitalesed Interest - means accreed and unpaid interest that has been added to the principal balance of a Loan.

J. Costigers Notice - means any notice that describes the obligations of a costiger under this Note and that is signed by my conginer with respect to any Lean that I obtain subject to the terms of this Note under the Loan Program.

Diabatin subject to the terms of this Note under the Loan Program.

Diabatin control to the terms of this Note under the Loan Program.

Diabatin control to the terms of this Note under the Loan Program.

Diabatin adject to the terms of this Note under shown on my Loan check or the date the Loan funds are electronically transferred to my Institution.

Diackourer Statement - means a disclosure statement acting forth the information required by the federal Thull-in-Lending Act and Proferal Reserve Board Regulation Z. 12 C.R. Pan 226, or such cheer disclosure statement and Regulation Z. 12 C.R. Pan 226, or such cheer disclosure statement and Regulation Z. 12 C.R. Pan 226, or such cheer disclosure statement and Regulation Z. 1. Rostiquion - means the collectional institution, if any, to which the received committee the control beautions on the initial Disbursement Date and

7. Institution - means the educational institution, if any, to which the proceeds of my Load(s) are payable.
8. Interim Period - means the period beginning on the initial Disbussemon Date and coding on the date which is six (6) months after I graduate from, or otherwise cease to be excelled at least half-time at the Institution identified at the time of my Application or any other eligible Institution.
9. Loan - means all principal arms alsourced during the twelve (12)-month town of an academic year of the Loan Propian (as such year is designanted by your under the terms of this Note, plus interest on acid principal sums, interest on any Capitalized Interest, and other charges and fees that may become due under the Loan as provided in this Note.

in this Note.

10. Keytlank National Association Loan Program ("Loan Program") - means the

Promissory Note or any subsequent master student loan promissory note relating to loans obtained under the Lean Program and I have singled. I will receive a more Discisorare Statements with respect to each such new Lean. In addition, I understand and agree that, at your option, you may consolidate any or all of the following, and the Lean Programs on or after the class of this Note and before the date of this Note of this Note of the Note of t

Page 1 of 7

KAL NOTE ONLY OF KRINA

*On every page of the master student loan promissory note, I redacted the signer and co-signer's social security number, and the co-signer's name.

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

Cosigner Name;
on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June, and September), subject to the limitations borein. You will use the three month LIBOR published on the 20th day of the praceding month without regund to the two-day debayed effective date. If the 20th day of the month is not a business day, the preceding business day which used to determine the Current index. For purposes of this Paragraph E.3, "Possiness day" means any day the banke in New York and London see open for the transaction of business. You may round the "Current thoic" higher to two decimal places. For example, 6.68731% will be rounded to 6.69%. [This is an example and may not be reflective of the actual LIBOR, LIBOR is the British Banker's Association average of interbank offered rates for dollar deposits in the London market based on quotations at 15 major banks. LIBOR is never lay apricing index and is not necessarily the lowest indexer fast in the London carried based on quotations at 15 major banks. LIBOR is never lay apricing index and is not necessarily the lowest indexer fast in the case of the principal balance of my Longon, on the load topy of any other Period, and on the hast day of any period of forbestance. I agree to the additions of secreed and unpaid interest to the principal balance (the "compounding" of interest) as set forth in Paragraph E.1 and this Paragraph E.4.
FERNAS OF REPLAYMENT.

In Interim Period. 1 may, but am not required to, make payments of interest of the circuit in the circuit interest that the latest controlled the circuit interest that the total circuit and controlled circuit and circuit

- r. 1 as one OF REPAYMENT

 1. Interim Period 1 may, but am not required to, make payments of interest or principal during the Interim Period, You may add accrued capati interest that I do not pay during the Interim Period to the principal balance as set forth in Paragraphs E. 1 and E.4.

 2. Repayment Period During the Period
- principal during the Interim Period. You ray add accrued unpaid interest that 1 do not pay during the Interim Period to the principal balance as set forth in Paragraphia E. II and E.4.

 2. Repayment Period During the Repayment Period, 1 will make consocurive monthly payments in the indicated amounts by the payment due dates shown in my coupon book until 1 have pead all of the principal and interest and any other charges that I may owe under the Note.

 3. Repayment Terms I will repay my Loan in consecutive monthly installments of principal and interest. If my Variable Rate increases or decreases, so that the value amount I man tays to you increase or decreases, my monthly payment did tay the same but I will make more or favor monthly payments than would otherwise be same but I will make more or favor monthly payments than would otherwise be required. My monthly payment amount will not repay my Loan in full within the increases to the point where that amount will not repay my Loan in full within the increases to the point where that amount will not repay my Loan in full within the payment may not make the payment amount may be increased to the minimum payment that will obe so. If this should happen, you will notify one of my new monthly payment amount and any increase my monthly payment amount at any time.

 4. Amounts Owing at the Ead of the Repayment Period Since interest accrues daily upon the unpaid principal balance of my Loan, if I make payments after my payment due dates, I nay owe additional interest and returned check NSF fees. If I have not paid my late charges and in the subject of the payment amount to the amount accreasery to repay my Loan in affil.

 5. Application of Phyments You be my will increase the amount of my hast monthly payment amount to the amount necessary to repay my Loan in any munnor that ym ideternine within your sole discretion.

 5. Minimum Phyment Mowthitstanding any office provision of Paragraph F. if my required payment will not the set amount of my hast monthly payment w

The MIGHT TO PREPAY

I have the right to propay all or any part of my Lonn(t) at any time without penalty.

Prepayment of less than all of the outstanding balance of my Loan(s) will not reduce the amount of monthly payments or postpone the due date of monthly payments, but will reduce the number of payments I must make. In any event, I will not be entitled to a refund of any part of the interest or finance charge alrendy paid.

I. FORBEARANCE

- I. FORBEARANCE
 II an unable to repay any of my Loma in accordance with the terms established under this Note, i may request that you medify these terms. I understand that such modification would be at your option. I understand that I will remain responsible for all interest securing during any portial of forbearance.

 J. DEFAILET, WHOLE LOAN DUB
 Subject to the initiations of applicable law, I will be in default under this Note and you have the right to (i) give me notice that the whole outstanding principal balance accuraci interest, and all other amounts payable to you under the terms of this Note, are due and payable at once (subject to any applicable law that may give me a right

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

- to cure my default) and (ji) cease to make further disbursements to me if:

 1. I fail to make any monthly payment to you when due; or

1. I can so enase any montany payment to you when due, or
2. I dist, or
3. I break any of my other promises in this Note; or
3. I break any of my other promises in this Note; or
4. Any bankrupicy proceeding is began by or against me, or I assign any of my
nastus for the benefits of my creditors; or
5. I provide any folse writtens stacement in applying for any Loan subject to the terms
of this Note or at any time during the term of any such Loan; or
6. I become insolvent; or
7. In your judgment, there is a significant lessening of my ability to tepay any Loan
subject to the terms of this Note; or
8. I arin in default on any Loan subject to the terms of this Note I may already have
with you, or on any such Loan I may have with you in the finture.
My failure to receive a distensed or coupon book does not relieve use of my
responsibility and obligation of making the required payments for any Loan in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Note. If I am in default, I will be
required to pury interest or any Loan course gater default. The interest rate
(Variable Rate) after default will be subject to adjustment in the same manner as
before default.

(Variatile Auto-passed Charles) and the Collection court of the Auto-passed Collection Cost's When and as permitted by applicable law, I agree to pay you reasonable amounts, including reasonable attorney's fees for any attorney who is not your regularly salaried employees and corort and other collection court, that you incor an enforcing the terms of the Note if I am in default.

I will send written notice to you, or any subsequent holder of this Note, within ten (10) days after any change in my name, address, telephone number, or Institution

- coal (ii) anys after any change, in my name, autres, espender names, or incurrence corollainent states.

 2. Any notice required to be given to me by you will be effective (i) when mailed by first class mail to the latest address you have for me or (a) if I agree to receive notices and other communications of electronic mail address you have for me. Unless required by applicable law, you need not give a separate notice to the cossigner, if any 3. State Law, Notices As required by have, I am hereby notified that an egative credit report reflecting on my credit record may be submitted to a credit reporting agency (I fail by to fifth the terbors of my credit obligations. A married applicant may apply for a separate necround. I agree that the lesuler may obtain a consumer report (credit typer) about me from a consumer reporting agency (regredit bureau). Upon my request, I will be informed whether or not the lender oblained a consumer report about me from a first of the consumer reporting agency of the did for, the name and address of the consumer reporting agency whether the propring agency that of the consumer reporting states (propring agency that of the consumer reporting states) corporing agency that of the consumer reporting states of the states and the states and the states are states are states and the states are states and the sta (credit sport) about me from a consumer reporting ageicy (credit bornaul). Upon my request, will be informed whether on on the lender abbinded a consumer report about me, and if so, the name and address of the consumer reports and the report. If my Application is approved, subscriptor consumer reports may be requested or used in connection with an update, renewal or certains of the credit for which I have applied. NEW JERSEY NEESIDENTS: Because certain provisions of this Nate are subject to applicable law, they may be vited, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions. None of these provisions, however, is void, unenforceable as in supplicable in New Jersey. OHIO RESIDENTS: The Chilo lover against discrimination require last off creditor track credit equally available to all credit worthy customers, and that eredit reporting agencies meintain separate credit historics on each individual upon request. The Chilo invital reporting incurred in the interest of my starringe or family, (b) No provision of a manifal property agreement, a unalistical sittement under Section 76.9.9 or a cour decree under Section 76.9.0 of the Wisconsin Statutes adversely affects the interest of the readitor unless the creditors, prior to the time credit is granted, a furnished a copy of the agreement, a startenet or sterred or the same and softened to the creditor unless the creditors, prior to the time credit is granted, a furnished a copy of the agreement, statement or steeres or hos actual knowledge of the adverte provision when the obligation to the creditor is the first provision and softened to the creditor in the section of the Creditor which is creditor in the Creditor and the creditor in the

any other notice of this voice.

NOTICE TO COSIGNER: You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility. You may have to pay up to the full amount of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to pay tate fees or collection easis, which increase this amount. The bank can collect this debt from you without first stying to collect from the borrower. The bank can use the same collection methods against you that

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

Cosigner Name:

can be used against the barrower, such as suing you, garmitting your wages, ric. If this debt is even in default, that fact may become a pert of your credit record. This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

HLIMOUS AND MICHIGAN RESIDENTS: Notice to Cosigner. You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you de. If the borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have to. Be sare you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility. You may have to pay up to be full amount of the debt if the borrower doesn't pay the debt, borrower doesn't pay the debt, but we have to the debt if the borrower doesn't pay the debt, but we have to the debt if the borrower doesn't pay the debt, which increase this amount. The bank can use the same collection resthocks against you that can ho used against the borrower, such as using you, garmising you waying, etc. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit roount. This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

NEW YORK RESIDENTS: NOTICE: You agree to pay the debt identified below though you may not presentably receive sny peoperty, services, or mouse, You may be exued for payment although the person who receives the property, services, or money is able to pay. You should know that the Total of Payments listed below does not include finance charges resulting from delinquency, late charges, repossession or foreclosure costs, court cents or astroncy's fees, or other charges, repossession or foreclosure costs, court cents or astroncy's fees, or other charges that may be atted in the note or contract. You will also have to pay some or all of these costs and charges: if the note or contract, the payment of which you are guaranterion; requires the horrower to pay such costs and charges. This notice is not the note, contract, or other writing that obligates you to pay the debt. Read that writing for the exact terms of your obligation.

JURNITIECAL

of your obligation.
IDENTIFICATION OF DEST(S) YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY

IDENTIFICATION OF DERT(S) YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY
Name of Debtor: The person(s) identified as the borrower and co-borrower at the
time of Application.
Name of Crebbtr: KoyBank National Association, and its successors or assigns.
Date: The Date of this Note.
Kind of Debt: Education Lean
Total of Payments: The "Laan Amount Requested" identified at the time of
Application plus inserest as set forth in Paragraph E of this Note.
You acknowledge by your signature on this Note that you have been given a
completed copy of this notice and of each writing that obligates you or the Debtor on this debt.

completed copy of this notice and of each writing that obligates you or the Debtor on this dob.

VERMONT RESIDENTS: NOTICE TO COSIGNER: YOUR SIGNATURE ON THIS NOTE MEANS THAT YOU ARE SIGNATURE ON THIS NOTE MEANS THAT YOU ARE SOUALLY LIABLE FOR REPAYMENT OF THIS LOAN. IF THE BORROWER DOES NOT PAY, THE LENDER HAS A LEGAL RIGHT TO COLLECT FROM YOU.

N. COSIGNER OBLIGATIONS

If I signed this Note as a conigner, I hereby unconstitionally guarantee payment of the borrower's and/or or-borrower's Loan(s) subject to the terms of flic Note when the and in accordance with the terms of flis Note. I waive notice of accoptance collection of the terms of the source of accoptance controllation, submout initiation, contribation, subregation, and econocation! I agree that the borrower may agree to any forbearance, extension, or other modification of the repayment schedule and that such agreement will be binding on me. Ohless required by applicable law, if shall not be necessary for you to resort to or exhaust your remedies against the borrower audior or-borrower before calling on me to make repayment. I acknowledge that lawe read, sudexuand, and agree to the terms of the Congner Notice(s) that appears in Paragraph N and that applies to me and, if I am a California or lower costeni, to the iterms of the separate state-specific exigner notice incorporated in and muck a pair of this Note that applies to me.

O. INFORMATION SHARING Disclosure of Account Information: You may share information within the KeyCorp family of companies as well as with unaffiliated third parties external to Key as described in your Privacy Poiley. We specifically consent to you sharing information within the KeyCorp family of companies and with referral unaffiliated third parties.

NOTE: [We may clect to not out of information sharing, or may be automatically opticious ander our state law, as described in your Privacy Poiley. If [We are opted out, that election will override this constent to share, except for thise unstances in which you are otherwise permitted to share by law without our content.

P. DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNT INFORMATION TO CONSUMER

REPORTING AGENCIES; INACCURATE INFORMATION You are committed to furnishing compilet and accurate information about credit accounts, including any Loan subject to the terms of this Note, to consumer reporting especies. If the information you report about may of my Loans is inaccurate, Invited write to: Great Lakes Higher Education Servicing Corporation, P.O. Box 7860, Massion, WI 5370-7860. In my correspondence i should include the following information: my social security number, Loan secount number(s), a copy of my credit burses reporting reflecting the issociurate information, and my name, address, city, state and 2ip code. REPORTING AGENCIES; INACCURATE INFORMATION
You are committed to furnishing complete and accurate informs

Borrower Social Security Number:

Cosigner Social Security Number:

Q. ARBITRATION

Q. ARCHITEATION.

This Arbitration Provision sets forth the circumstances and procedures under which Claims (as defined below) may be arbitrated instead of hitigated in court. This Arbitration Provision supersedes and replaces any existing arbitration provision between our control.

Q. ARBITRATION

This Arbitration Provision sets forth the circumstances and procedures under which

Claims (as defined below) may be arbitrated instead of itigated in court. That

Arbitration Provision superatedes and replaces any existing arbitration provision

between your and me.

This Arbitration Provision superatedes and replaces any existing arbitration provision

between your and me.

This Arbitration Provision will apply to my Note or Peise Promisonry Note (as

defined belowly times I notify you to writing that I e-eject the Arbitration

Provision within 60 days of signing any Note. The rejection notice should be sent

to key Education Resource-Arbitration, P.O. Box 55445, 80-10a, MA 62265
5445. The notice must include the berrower's name, the tames of any

conserver and the co-berrower or codigues, if any. The rejection notice should

be berrower and the co-berrower or codigues, if any. The rejection notice should

and include any other correspondence. The rejection notice should

and include any other correspondence. The rejection notice should

and controperated this Arbitration Provision will become part of this Note.

Rejection of this Arbitration Provision will become part of this Note.

Rejection of this Arbitration Provision will become part of this Note.

Rejection of this Arbitration Provision, the words 'you' and 'your' shall mean

Keylback Notional Association, Claveland, Ohio, third parties that have or may have

that a relation that the properties and properties of the Arbitration in which were

and in elicer under the Loan Program before the date of this Note (and flate) to

consolidated or the total outstanding balance of which is aggregated under Paragraph B. ('Price Promissory Note,'), and all of their respective parcase,

wholly or mapping words dishidients, Affiliation, provision, in the word "Raingaph B. ('Price Promissory Note,'), and all of their respective parcase,

wholly or mapping words dishidients, affiliation, provision, and provision and the process of which is aggregated

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgore

COSIGNE NAME.

IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR RAWE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM, OR TO ENCAGE IN PRE-ARBITRATION DISCOVERY EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE APPLICABLE ARBITRATION RULES FRUTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THER RIGHT TO FARTICHATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS RETARINTO TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. EXCEPT AS SET FORTH BELOW, THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND BINDING. I UNDERSTAND THAT OF THE RIGHTS THAT I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. THE FEES CHARGED BY THE ARBITRATION.

FINAL AND BINDING. I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS THAT I WOILD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. THE FEBS CHARGED BY THE ARBITRATION AND BE GREATER THAN THE FEBS CHARGED BY A COURT. There shall be no sutherity for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis. Furthermore, an arbitration can only decide your or try Claim(s) and may not consolidate or join the claims of other persons that may have smaller claims. There shall be no pre-arbitration discovery except as provided for in the applicable Arbitration Rales. Any arbitration heaving that lattend shall take place in the federal judicial district of my creidence. At my written request, you will pay all fees up to \$10,000 claraged by the arbitration administrator for any Claim(s) asserted by me in the arbitration, after I have poind an amount equivalent to the fee, if any, for filing such I reside. (If I have already paid a filing fee for asserting the Claim(s)) in court, I will not be required to pay that arrount again.) If I am required to pay any fees in excess of \$10,000 to the arbitration administrator ("additional foot"), you will consider a request by me in pay all or part of the additionals fees. The extent that you do not approve my request, the Arbitrator will decide whether you or I will be responsible for paying any such additional fees. If the arbitrator essues an award in your trivor, I will not be required to trimbure you for any of the fees you have previously paid the administrator or for which you are responsible. Each party shall bort the expense of the administrator essues an award in your trivor, I will not be required to rimbure you for any of the fees you have previously paid in the administrator or for which you are responsible. Each party shall bort the expense of that party's attorney's experts', and withines feel, regardless of which party prevails in the arbitrator, unless applicable be assumed this Note gives a party the right to recover any of those fees from the other party.

This Arbitratio

Borrower Social Security Number.

Cosigner Social Security Number:

- Cosigner Social Society Number:

 For purposes of puragraph R.L.*T.* "we", and "my" refer only to berrower.

 2. Cancellation of Disbursements If I am not satisfied with the terms of each disbursement. I will return the disbursement has been proved. I may caused such disbursement. To cancel the disbursement has proved. I may caused such disbursement. To cancel the disbursement has been disbursement was sent to the loading the disbursement of the disbursement. To cancel the disbursement was sent to the loading the other of other districts and the provided of the disbursement was sent to the loading the other of the disbursement was sent to the loading the disbursement will not transit to my within the minery (40)-40 kg erend. I will notify you of statement to the disbursement will not transit only disbursement made under the terms of this Note.

 3. Otherwise of Miners I understand that I must repay this Note though I may be under eighten (18) years of age when this Note is repard.

 4. Perial Physican No Weiser of Rights Note is repard.

 4. Perial Physican to Miners I understand that I must repay this Note though I may be under eighten (18) years of age when this Note is repard.

 4. Perial Physican No Weiser of Rights Note is repard.

 4. Perial Physican to more that a capacined appoint nation to be made. Webout losting any of your rights under this Note; you may accept have or partuel perprent. I suggest on the terms of this Note is unalfected by the liability of any other person to me by your fights under this Note; you may accept have or partuel perprent.

 4. Store of the part apprent has not that a capacined appoint nation to be minde. Webout losting any of your rights under this Note; you may accept have or partuel perprent.

 5. Superment of the partuel of the partuel perial perial

- promissory that rote are consolidated under the terms of a new master student ion promissory that relating to loans obtained under the Loan Program that I have signed, such new note will superside and replace this Note.

 9. Severables Mr.

- the terms of this Note are consolidated under the terms of a new master student loan promissory near relating to loans obtained under the Loan Program that I have a good, such new note will supermede and replace this Note.

 9. Severability If any provision of this Note is held involid or unenforecoistic, that provision shall be considered omitted from this Note without allecting the validity or inforecability of the remainder of this Note.

 10. Joint and Individual Liabelity If more than one person signs this Note, 1 agree to be fully reproactible for payment of this Note, and you may collect from one without trying to collect from other aigners. You can extend or change the terms of payment and release any security without notifying more releasing me from any responsibility on this Note.

 11. Lean Changes If the charges on any Loan subject to the terms of this Note exceed the amount permitted to be charged by the law that governs this Note, the subject of the

S. MY CERTIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perhay under the laws of the United States of America that
the following it true and correct. I certify flust the information contained or included
in my Application for my Louis subject to the terms of this Note is true, complete,
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and is made in good faith. I, also,
certify that all proceeds of any such Loan will be used solely for education
expertises and/or other expenses relating to the Loan Prugnan. I authorize any
testitution that I for if I can not the student, the student may aftend to release to the
lender, subsequent holder, or their agents, any requested information pertunent to any
Loan subject to the terms of this Note (e.g., employment, enrollment status, pror
loan history, current address). I give you permission to request information from me
and to make whatever inquirities you consider necessary and appropriate (including
requesting and obtaining a ensurem report from consumer reporting agencies) in

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgure

Cosigner Name:

Cosigner Name;
considering granting such Lasta or disbursements under such Loan and for the purpose of any updates, renewels, or extensions of such Loan, reviewing or collection of my Loan, are for any other lawful purpose. I also authorize the lender subrequent holder or their agents to check my credit and employment history and to acrewer operations about their credit experience with me. I also authorize the lender, absoluted their credit experience with me. I also authorize the lender, absoluted their credit experience with me. I also authorize the lender, subsequent holder, institution, or their agently for make inquiries or to respond to inquiries from my (m, if I am not the student, the student's) parents or prior or subsequent lenders or holders with respect to this Note and related obscarents. For the purpose of learning my curront authorise and telephone number, I authorize to the individuals I have listed on my Application est references. I authorize my lender, subsequent holder or their agents to release information of the states of my Application or of any turb Loan. I may sak you or a subsequent holder to change the date of disburnement if the Helacultonal Insuitation requires different payments. I further authorize any lender or any holder of my outstanding educational loans to release any information on are yof ony outstanding educational loans to release any information on are yof ony outstanding educational loans to release any information on are yof ony outstanding educational loans to my other lender or holder of my of my other chanational loans. I undersand that I must immediately repay any touts that I receive that cannot reasonably be attributed to

Borrower Social Security Number: *

Cosigner Social Security Number:

receing my educational expenses related to attendence at an eligible Institution and/or other expenses relating to the Loren Program. At my lendary's option, I unclassitudi fish my lender may electronically transmit florels for the Institution to applied to my (or. if I am not the student, the students) account. I authorize, my lender to issue a check made payable in me (or, if I am not set student, the students) expositly payable to the Institution and me (or, if I am not the student, the student, or jointly payable to the Institution and me (or, if I am not the student, the student is eligible for participation in the Loren Program and that I understand the student is eligible for participation in the Loren Program and that I understand the provisions of this Note and my responsibilities and my rights under the Loren Program. I also certify that I have not filed for bankruptcy in the past seven years.

By: Lett. D. Rosenberg, President 127 Public Square, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1306

	NT THAT I THOROUGHLY READ TO	HE CONTRACT BEFORE I SH	GN IT.		SWIGOTH STATE
NOTICE TO CONSUMER/O					
(a) I WILL NOT SIGN THE	S AGREEMENTINOTE BEFORE I	READ IT (EVEN IF OTHER)	WISE ADVISED).		
	S AGREEMENT/NOTE IF IT CONT				
(c) I AM ENTITLED TO A	N EXACT COPY OF ANY AGREEM	IENT I SIGN.	12:22		
(d) I HAVE THE RIGHT A	I ANY TIME TO PAY IN ADVANCE	THE UNPAID BALANCE D	DE UNDER THIS AGREE	MENT/NOTE WITHOUT	PENALTY
(c) I UNDERSTAND THAT	THE MASTER STUDENT LOAN P	ROMISSORY NOTE COVER	INING MY LOAN CONTA	UNS AN ARBITRATION I	PROVISION
UNDER WHICH CERT	AIN DISPUTES (AS DESCRIBED IT	N THE ARBITRATION PROV	ISION) KETWEEN ME A	ND YOU AND/OR CERTA	IN OTHER
PARTIES WILL BE RE	SOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATT	ION, IF ELECTED BY ME O	R YOU OR CERTAIN OT	HER PARTIES, IF A DISP	UTE IS
ARBITRATED, THE PA	IRTIES WILL NOT HAVE THE OPI	PORTUNITY TO HAVE A JU	DGE OR JURY RESOLVE	TT AND OTHER RIGHT	S MAY BE
SUBSTANTIALLY LIM	ITED.				
I acknowledge that,I ha	ave received a copy of this Not	te, Notices and all Cosigi	ner Notices.		
		11.	2 2004		
		7VOV.	2,2004		
Boyrowcy's Signature		Date	250	Social Security Number	
6		161-7	2004		
			000	man fact the same	Acres 1
Cosigner x anture		Date		Social Security Number	

Sign and mail Note to: Key Alternative Loan, c/o Great Lakes, P.O. Box 182736, Columbus, OH 43218-2736

YOU MUST RETURN ALL PAGES OF THIS SIGNED PROMISSORY NOTE

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REDACTED

Date: October 21, 2004

Borrower Name: Matt C. Kilgere
Cosigner Name:

Borrower Social Security Number: Cosigner Social Security Number:

CALIFORNIA RESIDENTS COSIGNER NOTICE

NOTICE TO COSIGNER (Traducción en Inglés Se Requiere Por La Ley)

You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn't pay the debt, you will have to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility.

You may have to pay up to the full amount of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to pay late fees or collection costs, which increase this amount.

The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, such as suing you, garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record.

This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.

AVISO PARA EL FIADOR (Spanish Translation Required By Law)

Se le está pidiendo que garantice esta deuda. Piénselo con cuidado antes de ponerse de acuerdo. Si la persona que ha pedido este préstamo no paga la deuda, usted tendrá que pagarla. Esté seguro de que usted podrá pagar si sea obligado a pagarla y de que usted desea aceptar la responsabilidad.

Si la persona que ha pedido el préstamo no paga la deuda, es posible que usted tenga que pagar la suma total de la deuda, mas los cargos por tardarse en el pago o el costo de cobranza, lo cual aumenta el total de esta suma.

El acreedor (financiero) puede cobrarle a usted sin, primeramente, tratar de cobrarle al deudor. Los mismos metodos de cobranza que pueden usarse contra el deudor, podran usarse contra usted, tales como presentar una demanda en corte, quitar parte de su sucido, etc. Si alguna vez no se cumpla con la obligación de pagar esta deuda, se puede incluir esa información en la historia de credito de usted.

Este aviso no es el contrato mispao en que se le echa a usted la responsabilidad de la deuda.

11-2-04 (Date) (Co.

(Cosigner Signature)

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REDACTED*

Applicant's Name: (First & Last) Matt Ailgore

Personal References: Please list four, all must have COMPLETE Addresses, with City, State and <u>Zip Code</u>.

(Physical address only, P.O. Box NOT acceptable.)

To Qualify as a Personal Reference the persons listed must have known the applicant for at least one (1) year and cannot reside at the same address.

Name:	Address:
	Street
Home Phone#	City:StateZip Code
Name:	Address:
	Street:
Home Phone#	City:StateLip Code
Name:	Address:
	Streel:
Home Phone #	City:StateCode
Name:	Address:
	Street:
Home Phone #	City: State Zip Code

If you have any personal accomplishments, special skills or training that you Would like us to know prior to an interview please list on a separate sheet of paper.

3.

*I redacted the names and contact information of the references.

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REDACTED

Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Key Alternative Loan

MATT C KILGORE

Creditor: KeyBank National Association Please direct all questions or correspondence to: Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. 2401 International Lano Madison, WI 53704-3192 (800) 236-4300

SILVER STATE HELICOPTERS LLC

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE The cost of your credit as a yearly rate.		Amount Financed The amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf.	Total of Payments The amount you will have paid after you have made all payments as scheduled.
5-16% c	\$44,098.80	\$55,950.00	\$100,048.80 e

Your payment schedule will be:

Number of Payments	Amount of Payments	Payments are Due Monthly Commencing
240 °	\$416.87 e	05/01/2007 ^c

Variable Rate: The Variable Rate on this loan may increase or decrease and is equal to the "Current Index", plus a margin as defined below. The "Current Index" is the three-month London Interbank Officred Rate ("LIBOR") published in the "Money Rates" section of The Wall Street Journal on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June and September). During the Interim Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. During the Repayment Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. The Variable Rate is the Rate will change quanterly on the first day of each Inmuny, April, July and October (the "Chauge Date"). Under no circumstances will the Variable Rate exceed the maximum rate allowable under applicable law. Increases in the Variable Rate may result in an increase in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the interest rate may result in higher payments. For example, if your repayment amount is \$62,700 for 240 months with a monthly payment of \$564,13 and an initial interest rate rate payment period would increase by 34 months. The repayment term is the aggregate of the ometanding principal balance of all your loans in the program as outlined in your Promissory Note. The most current Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure will provide the repayment term.

Late Charge: If a payment is more than 15 days late, you may be charged the lesser of \$5 or 5% of the unpaid amount of the payment.

<u>Prepayment:</u> If you pay off your loan early, you will not be entitled to a refund of any part of the Loan Fee. If you pay off your loan early, you will not have to pay a penalty.

See your appropriate contract documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, prepayment penalties and any required repayment in full before the scheduled date. All numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosure are estimates based on your 10/01/2006 anticipated graduation date.

(e) means an estimate

Itemization of the Amount Financed of: \$55,950.00
Loan Amount given to you directly: N/A
Amount paid to others on your behalf: \$55,950.00
Total Loan Fee: \$0.00

Schedule of Advances of Amount Financed

Scheduled Date of Advances	Amount of Advances	Loan Fee
11/15/2004	\$16,000.00	\$0.00
01/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
04/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
07/05/2005	\$13,212.00	\$0.00

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REDACTED

Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure - Revised Disclosure Key Alternative Loan

07/01/2005 MATT C KILGORE

Creditor: KeyBank National Association Please direct all questions or correspondence to: Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. 2401 International Lane Madison, WI 53704-3192

SILVER STATE HELICOPTERS LLC

RATE	FINANCE CHARGE The dollar amount the credit will cost you.	Amount Financed The amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf.	Total of Payments The amount you will have paid after you have made all payments as scheduled.
6.62% ^e	\$60,157.20 ^e	\$55,950.00	\$116,107.20 ^e

(800) 236-4300

Your payment schedule will be:

Number of Payments	Amount of Payments	Payments are Due Monthly Commencing
240 ^e	\$483.78 [©]	05/01/2007 ^e

Variable Rate: The Variable Rate on this loan may increase or decrease and is equal to the "Current Index", plus a margin as defined below. The "Current Index" is the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOGA") published in the "Money Rates" section of The Wall Street Journal on the 20th day of the month preceding the applicable "Change Date" (e.g., December, March, June and September). During the Interim Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. During the Repayment Period, the Variable Rate is equal to the "Current Index" plus 3.30% per annum. The Variable Rate will change quarterty on the first day of each January, April, July and October (the "Change Date"). Under no circumstances will the Variable Rate exceed the maximum rate allowable under applicable law. Increases in the Variable Rate may result in an increase in the number of payments while decreases in the Variable Rate may result in a decrease in the number of payments. In cases where the monthly payment will not repay the loan in full within the maximum permissible Repayment Period, an increase in interest rate may result in higher payments. For example, if your repayment amount is \$62,700 for 240 months with a monthly payment of \$564.13 and an initial interest rate of 9.00% and on the first Change Date the interest rate increases to 9.50% immediately after your first monthly payment, your repayment period would increase by 34 months. The repayment term is the aggregate of the outstanding principal balance of all your loans in the program as outlined in your Promissory Note. The most current Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure will provide the repayment term.

Late Charge: If a payment is more than 15 days late, you may be charged the lesser of \$5 or 5% of the unpaid amount of the payment.

<u>Prepayment:</u> If you pay off your loan early, you will not be entitled to a refund of any part of the Loan Fee, If you pay off your loan early, you will not have to pay a penalty.

See your appropriate contract documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, prepayment penaltics and any required repayment in full before the scheduled date. All numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosure are estimates based on your 10/01/2006 anticipated graduation date.

(e) means an estimate

 Itemization of the Amount Financed of:
 \$55,950.00

 Loan Amount given to you directly:
 \$13,212.00

 Amount paid to others on your behalf:
 \$42,738.00

 Total Loan Fee:
 \$0,00

Schedule of Advances of Amount Financed

Scheduled Date of Advances	Amount of Advances	Loan Fee
11/15/2004	\$16,000.00	\$0.00
01/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
04/05/2005	\$13,369.00	\$0.00
07/05/2005	\$13,212.00	\$0.00

35-70 (05-05)