

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Preliminary Comments to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission¹ January 2020

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission (the Commission) is expected to deliver a report to the administration and Congress, recommending a consensus strategy to defend the U.S. against cyberattacks of significant consequence.² Commissioners are tasked with addressing several key questions, including:

- What are the appropriate roles and responsibilities across the public and private sectors when it comes to securing U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity?
- Is there an ideal mix of standards, incentives, and education to help the U.S. be better prepared to address a range of malicious activity, such as cybercrime and state-backed hacking?
- What is the role of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in this effort? Where does DoD's responsibility to respond to persistent campaigns perpetrated by hostile governments begin and end?
- What is the full array of nonmilitary instruments of U.S. power available to the federal government?
- How should the U.S. and its allies promote global norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace?³

www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515

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² Section 1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115–232).

³ Sen. Angus King and Rep. Mike Gallagher, "Announcing the Cyberspace Solarium Commission," *Lawfare* (August 19, 2019). www.lawfareblog.com/announcing-cyberspace-solarium-commission

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce urges the Commission to champion the following proposals, which are organized into six areas. We believe that they are risk-based, will be effective and actionable, and are aligned with many of the Commission's objectives.

1. Foster U.S. Cyber and Economic Resilience

- The Commission's recommendations should actively promote the National Institute of Standards and Technology's *Cybersecurity Framework* (the *Framework*) in the U.S. and internationally.
- Congress should pass legislation that grants users of the *Framework* legal liability protections to strengthen business resilience and certainty. Positive incentives would broaden the use of the *Framework* and quicken national response and recovery efforts in the wake of a significant cyber incident.
- Increased use of the *Framework* by the business community should be paired with an energized federal effort to streamline cyber regulations.

2. Increase the Defense of the Internet Ecosystem

- Congress should pass federal Internet of Things (IoT) cyber legislation that reflects the
 consensus IoT security baseline, protects device makers and buyers from liability, and
 reduces policy fragmentation globally. The bill should preempt state laws and
 regulations. Federal legislation would bolster U.S. security and demonstrate leadership at
 home and abroad.
- The Commission should support modernizing the SAFETY Act⁴ through a simple legislative fix. Increasing the number of SAFETY Act-approved cyber technologies that are deployed throughout companies and agencies would reduce cyber risks that the public faces from rampant state-backed and criminal hacking.

3. Promote International Norms and Deterrence in Cyberspace

- For the past few years, non-governmental groups and companies have taken the initiative to push for norms of responsible state behavior. However, the administration should remain engaged globally to persuade countries to join the U.S. side, including partnering with industry on cyber norms development and promotion.
- A public-private dialogue on challenging topics like sanctions is needed to improve cyber conflict management. Sanctions should be linked to specific foreign policy aims, be multilateral and conduct based, and avoid overreach, among other considerations.

www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005

⁴ The SAFETY Act is short for the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002. Subtitle G of the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L 107–296).

• The U.S. policy shift concerning persistent engagement with our adversaries should be examined by the Commission. Little is known about how the change in doctrine would play out in practice. To be successful, persistent engagement should factor in both U.S. government and industry goals.

4. Improve Public-Private Collaboration and Situational Awareness

- Congress should establish and fund a critical infrastructure and intelligence community
 cybersecurity risk mitigation program (the cyber program) at the Office of the Director of
 National Intelligence (ODNI). The cyber program would facilitate the voluntary
 designation of critical infrastructure entities as customers of the U.S. intelligence
 community (IC).
- The cyber program would represent a key step toward deeper, more structured *bilateral* relationships, including activities related to defend forward and persistent engagement, than the current cyber information-sharing process.
- Policymakers should make cyber threats against critical infrastructure a priority across
 the IC, and foster relationships between the private sector and all members of the IC, as
 appropriate. Currently, a program for routine public-private analytic efforts does not
 exist.

5. Enable Defend Forward Activity to Support U.S. Critical Infrastructure

- The cornerstone of U.S. cyber strategy should be defense and resilience. But there is a consensus that defense alone is insufficient to disrupt or deter pernicious cyber operations, particularly those launched by states or their surrogates and other malicious actors.
- The administration's 2018 *Cyber Strategy* offers a potentially sensible approach to U.S. cybersecurity, specifically the principle of defend forward, which emphasizes disrupting or defeating malicious cyber operations at their source.
- Congress should legislate the concepts underpinning defend forward as key elements of America's cybersecurity architecture. Legislation should also state that DoD and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are both authorized and urged to help defend the private sector. The Chamber urges DoD/USCYBERCOM to show restraint in the area of cyber offense.
- Policymakers should ensure that all instruments of U.S. power are engaged at the earliest
 moment against significant cyber threats to protect American interests and promote
 stability and responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

6. Optimize Government Structures and Funding

• Policymakers should continue to clarify the rights, roles, and responsibilities of the public and private sectors, including backing a proposed model of Defense Support to the Private Sector (DSPS).

4

- The Commission should proceed cautiously concerning recommendations that establish new federal bodies, particularly ones that would have regulatory authority. Existing agencies should be pressed to excel and be held accountable. Any new organization should fill a demand that is not already being met—or that could be met—by an existing institution.
- The Chamber recommends that cybersecurity management roles at the White House (e.g., cyber coordinator) and the U.S. Department of State (e.g., cyber ambassador) need to be elevated to strengthen intragovernmental coordination and engagement with the private sector.
- The administration and Congress should collaborate with the private sector to take a more active and risk-based approach to U.S. engagement in international cyber standards bodies. The White House should request, and the Congress should appropriate, additional funding for the U.S. Department of Commerce to facilitate international cyber standards efforts side by side with the business community.
- The Commission should support investing in and expanding the U.S. network of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). The Commission should urge the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to create a private-sector advisory board to write and implement international agreements called for under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act.⁵

⁵ Division V of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115–141). www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1625