If competing AI firms agree that safety requires slowing or coordinating the rollout of new capabilities, should antitrust law treat that as ordinary procompetitive safety cooperation, or as conduct requiring special protection?
We put this question to our contributors, offering two framing options:
1. No exemption is needed, because existing antitrust principles can already distinguish genuine, narrowly tailored safety cooperation from naked restraints; or
2. An exemption or guidance is needed, because horizontal agreements to slow innovation or coordinate deployment carry obvious antitrust risk regardless of motive, and a defined safe harbor would help.
The responses spanned a real range — from confident rejections of any special treatment to more measured calls for a middle path — but a clear center of gravity emerged: most respondents resisted a formal exemption while still seeing value in agency guidance.
The U.S. Chamber has assembled a range of preeminent experts in the field of antitrust from across a wide political spectrum to offer timely views on key questions of antitrust law and policy.
No exemption needed — existing principles are enough
Several respondents held the line firmly against any carve-out. One argued that antitrust law has a long history of disfavoring exemptions, and AI shouldn't be an exception:
"There is a long history in U.S. antitrust disfavoring antitrust exemptions. AI should be no exception. The issue is more about the choice of policy for ensuring that the development of frontier AI model poses no risks to humans, society, and the world order. Major developers have already proven that they do not operate under those incentives. The best policy, therefore, is a system of ex ante regulation of AI."
Another made a similar point, while acknowledging the tradeoff of leaving the law as-is:
"No exemption needed. While lack of an exemption risks chilling procompetitive conduct due to fear of legal risk, there is little reason to clutter the law with bespoke exceptions. A standard setting organization may be effective in addressing safety concerns within the current antitrust framework."
No exemption, but guidance would help — the more measured middle ground
The most common response landed here: reject a formal exemption, but welcome agency guidance as a useful supplement. The simplest version of this view was direct:
"No exemption is needed but guidance would be welcome and useful."
Others elaborated on why guidance — rather than a statutory fix — is the right tool, pointing specifically to existing mechanisms like business review letters and advisory opinions:
"Neither option fully captures my view, though option 1 (no exemption) is closer. I certainly don't think an exemption is necessary or appropriate, and I think general rule of reason analysis can handle the current need for legitimate cooperation. But some guidance from the agencies, possibly including prompt (!) responses to requests for DOJ business review letters or FTC advisory opinions, might be helpful in both giving comfort and setting limits. As to the possibility of a general exemption, well, there's a long history of industry collaborations setting anticompetitive standards under color of safety justifications, and we should take care not to facilitate that."
Another respondent framed both options as partly true, while expressing some skepticism about whether today's agencies are up to the task:
"Both statements are true, with an important proviso: the normal application of antitrust principles can handle this, but guidance may well be needed in the form of a business review letter, which would seem well suited to the issue. But please, no exemption. Getting Congress involved and trying to come up with a one-size statutory exemption, history has shown, is unlikely to lead to a coherent and procompetitive outcome. I only wish I had more confidence that today's antitrust agencies would perform better."
Guidance needed, not exemption — a sharper critique of Option 1's logic
One response pushed further, rejecting Option 1 not just as unnecessary but as analytically flawed. The concern: Option 1's framing implicitly invites regulators to balance competitive harm against safety benefits — a move this respondent saw as both legally dubious and dangerous as precedent:
"Option 1 as stated troubles me because, in conceding that competition would be suppressed to the extent safety requires, it invites agencies and, perhaps, courts to offset competitive harm with non-competition benefits. Such balancing, in addition to arguably being precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in the National Society of Professional Engineers case, is beyond the remit and expertise of the agencies. In addition, explicitly accepting that a non-competition factor can justify anticompetitive effects could open the door to considering myriad other such factors based on the non-antitrust social and economic objectives de jour.
I would therefore vote for option 2, but in the form of guidance rather than an exemption. Entrusting Congress to enact an exemption risks codifying rules that may be rendered suboptimal or obsolete by technological developments and may be driven by short-term political considerations. Though agency guidance may entail the same risks, they strike me as less acute, as it is easier to amend or withdraw guidance that has outlived its utility and agency guidance would be (even now, arguably) a step removed from direct politicization."
Exemption or guidance needed — guarding against a slippery slope
At least one response was willing to countenance a formal exemption alongside guidance, worried that anything less invites incremental erosion of competitive norms:
"An exemption or guidance is needed for any explicit coordination; otherwise, we risk a slippery slope."
Takeaway
No one in the group wanted a hands-off, "safety justifies anything" approach, and virtually no one wanted Congress to legislate a bespoke exemption. The real debate was narrower: whether existing rule-of-reason analysis is sufficient on its own, or whether it needs to be supplemented — not replaced — by agency guidance, business review letters, or advisory opinions that give firms comfort without rewriting the law.






